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THE NEW YORK FELONY DISBARMENT RULE: A PROPOSAL FOR
REFORM
INTRODUCTION
An attorney occupies a privileged position in our society. As an officer of
the court,' his integrity is presumed; he is held out to the public as one
particularly worthy of trust and confidence. 2 The attorney's privileged posi-
tion was not artificially conceived. It proceeds from the very nature of the
practice of law. "The general public has need for a professional man in whom
it can repose a particular type of confidence whenever it is faced with some
distressing problems, often of a very personal nature."13 On the other hand,
the practice of the law implicates professional obligations beyond those
immediately owed by the attorney to his client. It "implies an equally
demanding relation of trust and confidence to the court and to the general
public, as well as high duties toward the law and the impartial administration
of justice." '4
"A Lawyer that is a Knave ... profanes the Sanctuary of the Distressed and
Betrays the Liberties of the People." 5 To deter knavery, to protect the public
and to ensure adherence to law and high standards of conduct, 6 society and
the profession have designed a system for disciplining errant attorneys.
Although the primary purpose of attorney discipline is protection of the
public, 7 strict enforcement also bolsters public confidence in law, lawyers,
and the legal system.8
1. E.g., In re Zuckerman, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 439, 231 N.E.2d 718, 721, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968). For a discussion of the ambiguity created by designating
an attorney an officer of the court, and the confusion this has engendered, see Cammer v. United
States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956). The historical derivation of the designation of the attorney as an
officer of the court is discussed in 6 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of the English Law 431-40
(1927).
2. E.g., In re Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 369 N.E.2d 1, 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1004 (1977)
(Wachtler, J., concurring); In re Levy, 37 N.Y.2d 279, 282, 333 N.E.2d 350, 352, 372 N.Y.S.2d
41, 44 (1975); 21 Alb. L. Rev. 100, 102 (1957); see Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281
(1957).
3. Forward to 1 A.-H. Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America at xi (1965).
4. Id. at xiv.
5. Id. at xi.
6. "Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair private and
professional character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is essential at the moment
of admission; but it is equally essential afterwards ..... In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E.
782, 783 (1917). "The [attorney] was received into that ancient fellowship [the bar] for something
more than private gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71,
162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928); see Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2cd 153, 156, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745, 386
N.Y.S.2d 95, 96-97 (1976).
7. In re Anonymous Attorneys, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 509, 362 N.E.2d 592, 595, 393 N.Y.S.2d
961, 963 (1977); In re Mitchell, 40-N.Y.2d 153, 156, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745, 386 N.Y.S.Zd 95,
96-97 (1976); see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968).
8. Public confidence is said to be necessary for the effective administration of the legal system.
See In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 156-57, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745-46, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1976);
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The most drastic form of discipline is disbarment. In New York, if an
attorney is convicted of a felony, 9 he is automatically disbarred.10 The
application of this rule has produced some bizarre results. For instance, in a
recent case, 11 a New York attorney was automatically disbarred for engaging
in what was described as a "kindergarten shouting and pushing match" with a
federal officer. 1 2 Cases such as this have made reexamination of the felony
disbarment rule a necessity. 13
This Note will begin with an overview of New York disciplinary proce-
dures. Next, the many problems of the felony disbarment rule will be
discussed along with some possible solutions to these problems. Finally, a new
automatic disbarment rule will be offered. 14
New York State Bar Ass'n, Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 9-1 to -2 (1978). See
generally Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J.,
dissenting), affid mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Apparently, current disciplinary procedures are not
very effective; public opinion of attorneys is low. Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and
Professional Regulation, 1976 Am. B. Foundation Research J. 917, 919-20; Note, Disbarment in
the United States: Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 1, 2 n.7
(1976).
9. The term "felony" has been construed to include all federal felonies. In re Chu, 42 N.Y.2d
490, 493, 369 N.E.2d 1, 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (1977), discussed at notee 90-102 infra and
accompanying text; see In re Thies, 45 N.Y.2d 865, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1978)
(per curiam). Certain sister state felonies are also included. See note 88 infra and accompanying
text.
10. Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law provides: "Any person being an attorney and
counsellor-at-law, who shall be convicted of a felony, shall, upon such conviction, cease to be an
attorney and counsellor-at-law, or to be competent to practice law as such.
"Whenever any attorney and counsellor-at-law shall be convicted of a felony, there may be
presented to the appellate division of the supreme court a certified or exemplified copy of the
judgment of such conviction, and thereupon the name of the person so convicted shall, by order
of the court, be struck from the roll of attorneys." N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4) (McKinney 1968).
Eight other jurisdictions also have some form of automatic disbarment procedure. Ala. Code §
34-3-86 (1975); Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 29(c), (d) (1973 & Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 454.18 (West
1965); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-501 (1973); Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-41 (1972); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 4, §
735 (1965 & Supp. 1978); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 320a-1, § 6 (Vernon 1973); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-51-37 (1953). Four other states have some form of automatic or mandatory suspension
provisions. Alaska Bar R. I, § 1(a) (1968); Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 100; S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §
16-19-37 (Supp. 1978); Wyo. Disciplinary Code R. X (1975). In the remaining states the
imposition of discipline is discretionary. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-401 to 417 (1962); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 12-5-108 (1973); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1906 (Supp. 1978); Idaho Code § 3-301
(1948); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 851 (1964); M',fich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.910 (1968); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 484.190 (Vernon 1952); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311:8 (1955); N.M. Stat. Ann. §
18-1-17 (1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 9.480 (1977); Va. Code § 54-73 (1978).
11. In re Thies, 45 N.Y.2d 865, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1978) (per curiam).
12. Bonomi, Automatic Disbarment-Amendment or Repeal, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1979, at 1,
col. 1, at 2, cols. 2-3 [hereinafter cited as Bonomi I]; see Freedman, Court of Appeals Stands Fast
On Disbarment of All Felons, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
13. See Bonomi I, supra note 12; Bonomi, Automatic Disbarment: Profession Speaks Out,
N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1978, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Bonomi II].
14. See notes 121-29 infra and accompanying text.
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I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK
The appellate division of each of the four judicial departments in the state
is vested with control over the discipline of attorneys. 15 They have the
authority to censure, suspend, or disbar an attorney.16 In addition, each
department delegates some disciplinary authority to local grievance commit-
tees. 17 These committees may be given the authority to issue an admonition or
reprimand. 1'8
An attorney is not subject to any form of discipline until he has been found
to have engaged in misconduct. By statute, an attorney who is found guilty of
"professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor,
or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" may be disci-
plined.1 9 Misconduct, however, has never been clearly defined. Each depart-
ment attempts to define professional misconduct in its court rules, but the
definitions are no more specific than the term itself. 20
Nevertheless, three classes of misconduct have been distinguished. These
are felonies, serious crimes, 2' and all other misconduct. Felonies result in
15. Section 90(2) of the Judiciary Law provides: "The supreme court shall have power and
control over attorneys and counsellors-at-law and all persons practicing or assuming to practice
law, and the appellate division of the supreme court in each department is authorized to censure,
suspend from practice or remove from office any attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to
practice who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or mis-
demeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice .... " N.Y. Jud. Law
§ 90(2) (McKinney 1968).
16. Censure is formal discipline imposed by the court; suspension is the temporary disqual-
ification from practice and disbarment is removal from the office of attorney. See id. Each
department makes its own rules of procedure. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 603.1-.22 (1st Dep't),
691.1-.22 (2d Dep't), 806.1-.12 (3d Dep't), 1022.1-.31 (4th Dep't) (1968-1969).
17. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 603.4 (1st Dep't), 691.4 (2d Dep't), 806.6 (3d Dep't), 1022.19 (4th Dep't)
(1968-1969). There are 17 such committees in the state. Hochberger, Lawyer Discipline: ABA
Draft Differs from New York Structure, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 3. The First
Department was the first to have laypersons on its committee. Id. The Second Department has
announced that it will also include laypersons. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 2. The
committees may have their own procedural rules. See, e.g., Rules and Procedures of the
Committee on Grievances of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1977).
18. E.g., 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.9(a) (Ist Dep't 1968). "An admonition is discipline imposed
without a hearing. A reprimand is discipline imposed after a hearing." Id. The committee may
also issue a letter of caution, but this is not a disciplinary action. A letter of caution is issued
when an attorney's behavior requires comment, even though it does not constitute misconduct.
Id. § 603.9(c). The distinction between disciplinary action and nondisciplinary action such as
issuing a letter of caution is not clear. The distinction appears to be based on the recording of
discipline as such. When a disciplinary body is deciding what discipline to impose, the attorney's
prior record of discipline may be considered. See, e.g., id. § 603.9(b), (c).
19. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(2) (McKinney 1968), quoted at note 15 supra.
20. The Third Department rules, for example, provide: "Any attorney who falls to conduct
himself in conformity with the standards of conduct imposed upon members of the bar as
conditions for the privilege to practice law, and any attorney who violates any disciplinary rule of
the code of professional responsibility ... or any other rule or announced standard of the court
governing the conduct of attorneys, shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct
within the meaning of subdivision 2 of section 90 of the Judiciary Law." 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 806,2
(3d Dep't 1969); accord, id. §§ 603.2 (1st Dep't), 691.2 (2d Dep't), 1022.12 (4th Dep't)
(1968-1969).
21. E.g., id. § 603.12 (1st Dep't 1968).
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automatic disbarment. 2 2 Serious crimes must be referred to the appellate
division, which may impose censure, suspension, or disbarment after a hear-
ing.2 3 All other cases of misconduct result in a proceeding before the disciplin-
ary committee. The committee is given discretion to decide whether to refer
the matter to the appellate division, impose an admonition or reprimand, or
dismiss the proceeding. 24 In determining the discipline to be imposed in cases
of serious crimes or other misconduct, the court or committee weighs the
gravity of the misconduct against the attorney's prior disciplinary record and
any mitigating circumstances. 25
Disbarment results in the disqualification of the attorney to practice law in
New York. If he continues to practice, he will be guilty of the misdemeanor of
unlawful practice of law. 26 New York disbarment, however, does not neces-
sarily preclude an attorney from practicing in federal or sister state courts. 27
Membership in the bar of a state court is a prerequisite to membership in the
bar of a federal court.28 Nevertheless, once an attorney is admitted to the
federal court only it can remove him. 29 Although the state order of disbar-
ment is not binding on the federal court, 30 the state's determination of
unfitness to practice law will raise a corollary presumption in the federal
court. 31 Unless the presumption is rebutted, the federal court will disbar the
attorney.32
22. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4) (McKinney 1968).
23. E.g., 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.12 (1st Dep't 1968).
24. Id. § 603.4(d); see id. § 691.4(e) (2d Dep't). The criteria used by the committee in deciding
whether to refer the matter to the court in cases in which they have discretion is not stated.
25. See, e.g., In re Neville, 31 A.D.2d 266, 297 N.Y.S.2d 271, aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 782, 250
N.E.2d 586, 303 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
26. N.Y. Jud. Law §§ 478, 484, 485, 486 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978-1979). An action to
enjoin the unlawful practice of law may be brought by the Attorney General, or, should he fail to
bring it, by a bar association. Id. §§ 476-a to 476-b. The Attorney General is given broad powers
to investigate complaints of unlawful practice. Id. § 476-c. Although these procedures are
available, they have not been vigorously exercised. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
27. E.g., Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1917) (disbarment from United States
Supreme Court). For a discussion of disbarment repercussions among the states, see Annot., 81
A.L.R.3d 1281 (1977).
28. E.g., Sup. CL R. 5; Fed. R. App. Prac. 46(a); S.D.N.Y. R. 3(a); see Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46, 49 (1917).
29. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 48 (1917).
30. Id. at 50.
31. See id.
32. In Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), the Court listed three grounds oh which the
state determination could be challenged: "I. That the state procedure from want of notice or
opportunity to be heard was wanting in due process; 2, that there was such an infirmity of proof
as to facts found to have established the want of fair private and professional character as to give
rise to a clear conviction on our part that we could not consistently with our duty accept as final
the conclusion on that subject; or 3, that some other grave reason existed which should convince
us that to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with
the duty which rests upon us not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles
of right and justice, we were constrained so to do." Id. at Si. In Theard v. United States, 354
U.S. 278 (1957), the Court applied the Selling principles to federal district court proceedings to
disbar attorneys previously disbarred by a state.
Currently, upon notice of an attorney's disbarment from practice in any state, he is automat-
ically suspended from practice before the Supreme Court. He will also be disbarred from practice
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW YORK FELONY DISBARMENT RULE
A. The Enforcement Gap
Under New York law, conviction of a felony ipso facto renders an attorney
unfit to practice law. 33 Consequently, upon the rendering of the judgment of
conviction, the attorney is disbarred. 34 The clerk of the particular court which
rendered the judgment is required to forward notice of the conviction to the
appellate division department in which the attorney was admitted. 3" Upon
receipt, the attorney's name will be stricken from the roll of attorneys. 36 This,
however, is merely a formality. Even if the attorney's name is not stricken, he
has still been disbarred. 37
Nevertheless, there may be a significant time period between his conviction
and the striking of the attorney's name. As a result, the disbarred attorney,
weighing the risk of detection and possible criminal sanction3 8 against the
deprivation of his professional life, may decide to continue practicing until his
name has been stricken. Although the Attorney General's office is empowered
to prosecute attorneys who continue to practice during this hiatus, 39 enforce-
ment has been lax. 40 This has resulted in an "enforcement gap" in New
York's disbarment procedure. 4 1
This problem is aggravated when the attorney is convicted in a federal or
sister state court because there is no effective procedure to ensure that prompt
notice of the conviction is forwarded to the appellate division.42 Indeed, if the
appellate division does receive notice, it is often the result of fortuitous
before the Court unless within 40 days he shows good cause why he should not be. Sup. Ct. R. 8.
Disbarment by a state has the same effect in the Second Circuit. Fed. R. App. Prac. 46. In the
Second Circuit, however, the attorney is served with a copy of an order of the court informing
him of suspension or disbarment. Within 20 days of receipt of the order the attorney may show
cause why the order should be modified or revoked. 2d Cir. R. 46f(1), (2). In the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, disbarment by a state subjects the attorney
to discipline to the same extent unless within 30 days he shows cause why the disbarment should
be modified. S.D.N.Y. R. 5(d).
33. In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 155-56, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (1976).
34. In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 157, 228 N.E.2d 896, 898, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1967);
In re Ginsberg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1956).
35. N.Y. Jud. Law § 486-a (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). This provision applies only to
forwarding notice of felony convictions. Each department, with the exception of the Third, has
court rules requiring its clerks to forward notice of convictions of attorneys for any crimes. 22
N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 603.12(d) (1st Dep't), 691.7(e) (2d Dep't), 1022.12(d) (4th Dep't) (1968-1969); see
note 119 infra.
36. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4) (McKinney 1968).
37. In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 157, 228 N.E.2d 896, 898, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1967);
In re Ginsberg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1956).
38. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 26 supra.
40. Fox, Felony Disbarments-An Enforcement 'Gap', N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1978, at 1, col. 2, at
2, col. 4; Oltarz-Schwartz, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1978, at 2, col. 6.
41. "Officials responsible for overseeing the disciplinary mechanism acknowledge that attor-
neys convicted of either a state or Federal felony, while technically disbarred at the moment of
conviction, can continue to practice for a minimum of two months, often longer." Fox, Felony
Disbarments-An Enforcement 'Gap', N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1978, at 1, col. 2, at 1, col. 2.
42. See Bonomi, Attorney Registration: A Disciplinary Must, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1978, at 1,
col. 1, at 30, col. 1.
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circumstances. 43 In these cases, the time lapse between conviction and the
striking of his name, during which the attorney may "safely" practice, may be
quite long.
The problem of the unlawful practice of law by disbarred attorneys during
the hiatus could be minimized. Upon receipt of the notice of conviction, the
appellate division or local grievance committees should investigate whether
the attorney has continued to practice after his conviction. If he has, the
appellate division should inform the Attorney General's office and suggest that
the errant attorney be prosecuted. The increased risk of detection should help
deter an attorney from the unlawful practice of law during the hiatus.
B. Readmission
In New York, until recently, felony disbarment resulted in a permanent
disqualification to practice law, except under certain limited circumstances."
Readmission was possible only if the attorney was pardoned or if his convic-
tion was reversed. 4S In either case, he could appeal to the appellate division
which could grant readmission in its discretion. 4 6 The felony disbarment rule,
however, resulted in permanent loss of livelihood in all other cases. Conse-
quently, vigorous debate ensued regarding the propriety of extending the right
of readmission to all felony-disbarred attorneys. The opponents of readmis-
sion argued that it was prejudicial to the public interest to permit those who
had been guilty of a breach of trust to be returned to a position of trust."'
Moreover, they argued, it was unfair to ask the public to assume the risk of
the felon-attorney's rehabilitation. 4
8
The weight of authority, however, favored readmission. 49 The rationale for
43. Id.
44. In re Sugarman, 64 A.D.2d 166, 409 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1978).
45. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(5) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (amended 1978). The disbarment
itself is effective regardless of any pending appeal of the conviction. In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d
153, 351 N.E.2d 743, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976); In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896,
281 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967); In re Ginsberg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361
(1956); see notes 70-72 infra and accompanying text.
46. Readmission upon pardon or reversal is not a matter of right. In re Kaufmann, 245 N.Y.
423, 157 N.E. 730 (1927). Kaufmann concerned an attorney convicted of a federal felony, who
was later pardoned by the President of the United States. The attorney wanted to argue his
innocence of the crime as grounds for readmission. The appellate division, assuming the
conviction was conclusive as to guilt, would consider only evidence of mitigating circumstances.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the pardon reopened the issue of guilt, but that the
burden of proving innocence was on the attorney. Id. at 428-29, 157 N.E. at 732. In re Ginsberg,
1 N.Y.2d 144, 147, 134 N.E.2d 193, 194, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (1956), applied this holding to
cases in which the attorney's conviction is reversed. Ginsberg was subsequently limited in In re
Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967), which held that, in cases of
reversal, the attorney would be entitled to readmission unless proceedings were brought against
his application with proof of charges sufficient to disbar him. Id. at 158, 228 N.E.2d at 898-99,
281 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
47. Bonomi II, supra note 13, at 2, col. 4; Oltarz-Schwartz, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 19, 1978, at 2, col. 6.
48. Bonomi II, supra note 13, at 2, col. 4; Oltarz-Schwartz, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 19, 1978, at 2, col. 6. This position has been characterized as presupposing the inability of
attorneys convicted of particular crimes to reform. In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 453, 333 N.E.2d
429, 434 (1975).
49. In considering the issue, the New York legislature received comments from 25 individuals
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allowing readmission was reviewed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
its consideration of Alger Hiss' application for readmission to the bar of that
state.5 0 The court stated that because our system of justice is founded upon
the principle of forgiveness and a belief in the possibility of rehabilitation, a
disbarred attorney should be given the opportunity to prove that he had
reformed.5 Indeed, the court concluded, he may then "become a credit to the
bar and an asset to those he serves."15 2
Under a recent amendment to its readmission statute, New York has allied
itself with the sentiments expressed in 'the Hiss opinion.5 3 The New York
statute now permits the felony disbarred attorney to seek readmission seven
years after his disbarment if he has not been convicted of a crime in the
interim. Although this amendment is salutory, the new law is not without
fault. The seven year disbarment period begins on the date of conviction. 4
The period should commence on the date the attorney's name is stricken from
the roll. 5 5 Under such a procedure, the attorney, wishing to "start the clock,"
would have an incentive to report his conviction. Such a procedure would
help to close the enforcement gap in the New York rule.5 6
In addition, the readmission statute does not specify the consequence of
conviction of a crime during the disbarment period. Conviction could forever
bar the attorney from readmission or merely start the seven year disbarment
period anew. To narrow the enforcement gap further, the statute should be
construed to bar permanently attorneys who are convicted of unlawful
practice during the disbarment period. This construction would further deter
any attorney from continuing his practice after conviction.
C. Constitutional Problems
1. Procedural Due Process
The requirenents of procedural due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment protect liberty and property interests. S7 Courts have held that an
and organizations, primarily attorneys and bar associations. Of these, 16 comments favored
passage of the bill which would allow readmission of felony disbarred attorneys, two had no
objection to the bill, one opposed passage, and four had no comment. The two remaining
comments concerned draftsmanship and fact finding. These comments may be found in the bill
jacket to 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 782.
50. In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975).
51. Id. at 454, 333 N.E.2d at 434. The attorney will "bear a heavy burden of proof" that he
has been rehabilitated. Id. at 454, 333 N.E.2d at 43.;.
52. Id. at 455, 333 N.E.2d at 435.
53. The pertinent portion of the Judiciary Law now provides: "Upon a reversal of the
conviction for felony of an attorney and counsellor-at-law, or pardon by the president of the
United States or governor of this or another state of the United States, or if during a period of
seven years after such removal or debarment [sic] the attorney and counsellor-at-law has not been
convicted of a crime, the appellate division shall have power to vacate or modify such order or
debarment [sic]." 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 782 (amending N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(5) (McKlnney Supp.
1978-1979)) (new matter in italics).
54. See N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1978, at 1, col. 5; notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
55. See Oltarz-Schwartz, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1978, at 2, col. 6.
56. See notes 38-43 supra and accompanying text.
57. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 599 (1972).
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attorney has a property right in his practice of lawA. s8 Under traditional
notions of due process, however, the mere existence of a property right is not
dispositive as to the procedures which must be adhered to before an individ-
ual may be deprived of his right.59 Typically, the person's interest in his right
must be weighed against the government's interest in summary adjudica-
tion. 60 In the context of automatic disbarment, attorneys have asserted that
summary adjudication violates their fundamental right to a hearing under the
due process clause.
6 1
The status of an attorney, however, is a "privilege burdened with condi-
tions."'62 The attorney's property right in the continuation of his practice is
limited by the obligations and conditions he assumes upon admission to the
bar. 63 Upon admission, the attorney is granted the privileges and status of the
profession. This grant, however, is subject to divestiture upon the breach of a
condition subsequent. compliance with the standards for continued member-
ship in the bar. The attorney has no "legitimate claim of entitlement""1 to his
property right if he breaches a condition of continued membership.
65
Two courts, considering the constitutionality of automatic disbarment rules
in jurisdictions other than New York, have held that the operation of those
rules violated due process by denying the attorney a hearing. 66 In each case,
58. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1353 (7th Cir. 1972);
Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 734, 741 (1964). Therefore, any deprivation of this
right must be in consonance with the requirements of due process. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
550 (1968); see Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 156, 351
N.E.2d 743, 745, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96-97 (1976).
59. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970); see Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 290 (1882).
60. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970).
61. In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527, 528 (8th Cir. 1974); see In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1353 (7th
Cir. 1972).
62. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E.2d 782, 783 (1917); accord, Theard v. United
States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); In re Anonymous Attorneys, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 508, 362 N.E.2d
592, 595, 393 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (1977); In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 157, 351 N.E.2d 743,
746, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1976); Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470, 162 N.E. 487, 489(1928).
63. "[Property interests] are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules of understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972).
64. Id. Typically, the person alleging the existence of the property right must prove a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
65. In another context, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of "conditions subsequent."
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 830 (1970). In this case, a foreign born child, with only one parent
who was a citizen, was granted United States citizenship. The grant, however, was subject to
divestiture upon the breach of a condition subsequent: a five year United States residency
requirement. The child failed to fulfill this requirement and he was divested of his citizenship. Id.
at 816-20; see In re Anonymous Attorneys, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 508, 362 N.E.2d 592, 595, 393
N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (1977); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972) (upheld
condition precedent to continued employment).
66. See In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th
Cir. 1972).
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however, the courts found unresolved issues of identity, finality and mitiga-
tion. 6 7
Due process, however, does not require a hearing when there is no issue to
be heard. 68 Under the New York statute, there are no such unresolved issues.
Identity is not an issue because the attorney is given notice of the proceeding
to strike his name. 69 If he is not the person who was convicted, he was not
disbarred and can so inform the court.
Finality is also not an issue. Although the disbarment is effective regardless
of any pending appeal, 70 there is no constitutional infirmity in this proce-
dure. 7 1 Due process does not require the allowance of an appeal; therefore,
the judgment of conviction at the trial level is entitled to respect as a final
judgment "unless and until reversed upon appeal. '7 2
Nor is mitigation an issue. The state has a right to prescribe the minimum
conditions that must be maintained in order to retain the privilege of
membership in the bar.73 If such a minimum condition by definition excludes
mitigation, there is no issue on which to have a hearing.
Under the automatic disbarment rule there is only one issue: whether the
condition of membership has been breached. This issue is conclusively
determined at the attorney's criminal trial.7' At the trial the attorney is
afforded not only a hearing but the full spectrum of due process rights. 7
67. In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th Cir.
1972).
68. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972).
69. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4), (6) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978-1979).
70. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
71. In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 351 N.E.2d 7,3, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976).
72. Id. at 157, 351 N.E.2d at 746, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 97. Contra, In re Ming, 469 F.zd 1352
(7th Cir. 1972).
73. "The State has a compelling interest in regulating our system of justice to assure high
standards of professional conduct." In re Anonymous Attorneys, 41 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 362
N.E.2d 592, 597, 393 N.Y.S.2d 961, 965 (1977). Because of the concept of attorneys as officers of
the court, however, there is some conflict over whether tie state may act through the legislature,
as opposed to the courts, in exercising control over attorneys. Some authorities assert that
legislative "interference" with disciplinary and admission proceedings is an unconstitutional
invasion of the power of a coordinate branch of government. Compare Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.
Supp. 182, 207-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), qf'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
with In re Thies, 45 N.Y.2d 865, 866-67, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 1351-52, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576
(1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). It seems clear, however, that the legislature may prescribe the
minimum requirements for retaining attorney status, though it is arguable that the legislature
could not deprive the courts of the power to set greater requirements. See Note, Disbarment in
the United States: Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 1, 4 (1975); 7
C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 19 (1937). See also Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281
(1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Javits v. Stevens, 382
F.Supp. 131, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Zuckerman, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 439, 231 N.E.2d 718,
721-22, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6-7 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
74. In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1356 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Levy, 37 N.Y.2d 279, 280, 333
N.E.2d 350, 352, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (1975); In re Patrick, 136 A.D. 450, 451, 120 N.Y.S.
1006, 1007 (1910).
75. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.Supp. 182, 210
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); see In re Ginsberg,
1 N.Y.2d 144,-148, 134 N.E.2d 193, 195, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (1956) (Van Voorhis, J.,
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2. Equal Protection
The felony disbarment rule also raises equal protection questions. Although
New York automatically disbars an attorney who is convicted of a felony, it
does not automatically preclude a felon from entering the bar.7 6 One commen-
tator has suggested that this disparate treatment constitutes a denial of equal
protection.77 There is no constitutional infirmity, however, in unequal treat-
ment of different classes if the distinction between the classes bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.
78
The preadmission felon and the attorney are not similarly situated. The
preadmission felon has neither assumed the responsibilities nor accepted the
privileges of an attorney. The attorney, upon admission to the bar, promises
to abide by the conditions of membership. The state has a legitimate interest
in enforcing this promise by a system of discipline.79 The preadmission felon
has made no such promise. Because attorney felons and preadmission felons
are not persons similarly situated, their disparate treatment is rationally
related to the state's interest in disciplining attorney felons.80
D. What Felonies Are Included in the Rule?
New York's felony disbarment rule does not specify which convictions in
other jurisdictions will trigger its operation.8  This omission has created
considerable controversy. A relatively easy question is raised when the felony
in the other jurisdiction is also a felony in New York. In such cases, courts
have uniformly held that the felony disbarment rule applies. s2 More difficult
problems are presented, however, when the felony in the other jurisdiction is
less than a felony or is not an offense at all in New York. 3 Also problematic
is the converse situation in which the offense is less than a felony in the
dissenting); In re Abrams, 38 A.D.2d 334, 336, 329 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (1972); 21 Alb. L. Rev.
100, 103 (1957).
76. N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1978, at 1, col. 4, at 2, col. 3.
77. Bonomi I1, supra note 13, at 2, col. 5. This distinction has been blurred; New York now
permits felony disbarred attorneys to seek readmission after seven years. See note 54 supra and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, the disparity remains during the seven year disbarment period.
78. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (rational
relationship test applied to employment rights); see F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920).
79. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
80. "The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); see
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1976); Mlildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 193-94
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd rnt., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131, 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Of course, a felon seeking admission to the bar must prove his fitness to be an
attorney like any other applicant. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(1)(a) (McKinney 1968).
81. The readmission provision implicitly recognizes that some federal and sister state felonies
are included because it refers to pardons by the President or by governors of other states. N.Y.
Jud. Law § 90(5) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); see In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 289, 26 N.E.2d
260, 261 (1940) (ruling under old statute).
82. In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940); In re Bogart, 46 A.D. 2d 555, 363
N.Y.S.2d 827 (1975) (per curiam).
83. See In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 290-91, 26 N.E.2d 260, 263 (1940).
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jurisdiction where the attorney is convicted but constitutes a felony in New
York.
4
The applicability of automatic disbarment to felony convictions in other
jurisdictions, for crimes not similarly classified in New York, was first
considered by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Donegan. 8 5 Donegan,
an attorney, had been convicted of a federal felony. The comparable offense
under New York law would have been, at most, a misdemeanor. 86 The
majority in Donegan held that only those federal felonies with New York
equivalents came within the ambit of the rule and, thus, automatic disbarment
did not apply.87 Similarly, in reliance on Donegan, automatic disbarment was
held to be inapplicable to cases of felony convictions in sister states when New
York had not enacted an equivalent felony.88 Automatic disbarment has also
been used in the converse situation in which the offense does not constitute a
felony in the jurisdiction of conviction but does constitute a felony in New
York. 89
In 1977, the court of appeals reconsidered Donegan in In re Chu.90 Chu, an
attorney, was convicted of a federal felony; the analogous New York felony
contained additional elements not present in the federal felony. 9 1 The appel-
late division, following Donegan, held that the felony disbarment rule did not
apply and ordered a disciplinary hearing.9 2 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that Chu's conviction fell within the scope of the rule. The court
reasoned that Congress' determination that such conduct required punishment
as a felony was sufficient to invoke automatic disbarment. 93 The court,
somewhat obfuscating the grounds for its holding, also stated that the
particular federal and New York felonies were sufficiently analogous so as to
warrant use of the felony disbarment rule. 94 The concurring opinion, object-
ing to the extension of the rule to include all federal felonies regardless of New
York felony equivalents, would have expressly limited the decision to this
latter reasoning. 95
One problem raised by Chu is whether its inclusion of all federal felonies
constitutes an impermissible delegation of power to the Federal government to
84. See In re Stein, 199 A.D. 673, 191 N.Y.S. 419 (1921).
85. 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940).
86. Donegan was convicted under a federal conspiracy law. In New York, any conspiracy
conviction was only a misdemeanor. Id. at 287, 26 N.E.2d at 260-61.
87. Id. at 290-91, 26 N.E.2d at 263.
88. E.g., In re Bogart, 46 A.D.2d 555, 363 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1975) (per curiam).
89. In re Stein, 199 A.D. 673, 191 N.Y.S. 419 (1921).
90. 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977).
91. Chu was convicted of filing false statements with a federal agency. The New York
analogue pertained to filing false statements with a subdivision of the state and required intent to
defraud the state. The statutes were distinguished on the basis that the federal law did not require
proof of intent to defraud and that the federal agency was not a subdivision of this state. Id. at
492, 369 N.E.2d at 2, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 493, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. The practical effect of this language
would be to overrule Donegan, but the court did not specifically do so.
94. Id. at 494, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1003. This language would uphold Donegan,
but relax the standard of equivalency.
95. Id. at 495, 369 N.E.2d at 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
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set the standards for New York disbarment. 96 Under the system of dual
sovereignty, however, federal law is entitled to the same respect as state law.
Upon admission to the bar of New York, the attorney swears to uphold the
state law and the Constitution and laws of the United States. 97 Thus,
automatic disbarment for conviction of a federal felony is not an impermissi-
ble delegation of power, but a recognition of the attorney's duty to obey and
uphold both state and federal law.
Because of the ambiguity of the Chu opinion, however, it was unclear
whether all federal felonies required automatic disbarment or if the Donegan
equivalency standard was now satisfied by mere substantial similarity be-
tween the federal and New York felonies. 98 Speculation was ended in In re
Thies. 99 There, the court, citing Chu, held that conviction of a federal felony
required automatic disbarment, regardless of the existence of a New York
equivalent. 0 0 The dissenters, the same judges who had concurred in Chit,
characterized the action of the majority as inviting "aberrational results."' 0'
Moreover, recognizing that the establishment of such a per se rule was
needlessly harsh and inflexible, the dissenters called upon the legislature to
remedy the situation.10 2
E. Reevaluation of the Felony Disbarment Rule
1. The Harshness of the Rule
Although the attorney has a duty to obey all laws, automatic disbarment
may be an unduly harsh form of discipline to impose for conviction of a crime
which does not impugn the attorney's fitness to practice law.' 0 3 The funda-
mental problem with the felony disbarment rule is the use of the term "felony"
as the standard for invoking automatic disbarment. As recognized by the
dissenters in Thies, this problem is exacerbated by the extension of the class of
felonies in Chu. For instance, in one case' 0 4 prior to Chit, an attorney was
convicted of conspiracy to melt silver coins, a federal felony, and was
96. Levitt, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1978, at 2, col. 6. This question applies
only to federal felonies as Chu did not apply to sister state felonies; the Donegan rule remains
applicable to sister state felonies. 42 N.Y.2d at 494 n.6, 369 N.E.2d at 3 n.6, 398 N.Y.S.2d at
1003 n.6 (1977).
97. In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 295, 26 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1940) (Loughran, J., dissenting).
98. Bonomi, The Appellate Division Attempts To Unravel the Chu Decision, N.Y.L.J., July
17, 1978, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
99. 45 N.Y.2d 865, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1978) (per curiam); see N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 12, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
100. 45 N.Y.2d at 866, 382 N.E.2d at 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 576. Although this is a
departure from Donegan, the idea that all federal felonies are included in the felony disbarment
rule is not new. Before Donegan, it was the general practice of the appellate divisions to invoke
automatic disbarment for offenses denominated felonies by any jurisdiction. See In re Ackerson,
289 N.Y. 844, 845, 47 N.E.2d 442, 442-43 (1943) (per curiam); I: re Koven, 282 N.Y. 646,
646-47, 26 N.E.2d 800, 800 (1940) (per curiam).
101. 45 N.Y.2d at 867, 382 N.E.2d at 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (although a state
may require high standards of qualification for admission to its bar, the exclusion of an applicant
for reasons unrelated to his fitness or capacity to practice law is a violation of due process).
104. In re Robinson, 45 A.D.2d 519, 360 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1974).
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censured. Under Chu, he would have been automatically disbarred. 105 In
Thies, Mr. Thies had been arrested on a federal charge. The arraigning
magistrate dismissed the complaint as insufficient.10 6 Thies, believing his
arrest to be unlawful, attempted to leave the courthouse. A scuffle ensued
when federal agents attempted to detain him. In the scuffle, an agent suffered
a bruised thumb.1 0 7 Thies was charged with assault on a federal officer, a
felony, and was convicted. At his sentencing, the judge not only scolded the
federal agents for their role in the scuffle, but also questioned the wisdom of
applying the New York disbarment rule to Thies.' 08 Nevertheless, Thies was
automatically disbarred. 0 9
The term "felony" does not describe any particular offense."I0 The offenses
which are classified as felonies vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
within each jurisdiction the classifications vary with the times."' For in-
stance, under old English law, such a heinous offense as "fishing in a private
pond by night" was denominated a felony." 
2
The continued use of the nonspecific term "felony" will invite the "aberra-
tional results" feared by the dissenters in Thies. 113 Selective application of
automatic disbarment would ensure the maintenance of strict attorney disci-
pline without the need to sacrifice fairness.' 1 4 An attorney who is convicted of
a felony that does not necessarily impugn trustworthiness should be afforded
an opportunity to be heard on mitigating circumstances; disbarment could still
result if warranted." 5
105. See notes 93, 100 supra and accompanying text.
106. Bonomi I, supra note 12, at 2, cols. 1-2.
107. Id. at 2, col. 2.
108. Id. at 2, cols. 2-3.
109. 45 N.Y.2d 865, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1978).
110. Both federal and New York law define felony in terms of the amount of punishment that
can be imposed for conviction of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1976); N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00(5)
(McKinney 1975).
III. See In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 290, 26 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1940) (discussion of the
term "felony").
112. Id. at 289, 26 N.E.2d at 262. Many felonies in the United States are antiquated and
many have no bearing on an attorney's trustworthiness or ability to represent a client. In re Chu,
42 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 369 N.E.2d 1, 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1004 (1977) (Wachtler, J., concurring);
Bonomi I, supra note 12, at 2, col. 4; Bonomi II, supra note 13, at 2, cols. 4-5 (discussing the
felonies of melting silver coins and possession of a switchblade knife on an Indian reservation),
Although automatic disbarment is usually imposed for convictions that do bear on an attorney's
fitness to practice law, this is not always the case. See, e.g., In re Glasser, 53 A.D.2d 38, 385
N.Y.S.2d 86 (1976) (per curiam) (cocaine conviction); In re Costigan, 39 A.D.2d 961, 333
N.Y.S.2d 984 (1972) (per curiam) (conviction for driving while intoxicated and while license
suspended or revoked). It is arguable whether such crimes render a person per se untrustworthy
or incapable of representing a client; therefore, they should not require automatic disbarment
without a hearing on mitigating circumstances. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has stated that it has a duty "not to disbar except upon the conviction that,
under the principles of right and justice, we Care] constrained so to do." Selling v. Radford, 243
U.S. 46, 51 (1917).
113. See 45 N.Y.2d 867, 382 N.E.2d 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d 576-77 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Although it would not invoke automatic disbarment, conviction of these crimes would
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2. Suggested Solutions
The primary purpose of attorney discipline is the protection of the pub-
lic.' 16 Thus, automatic disbarment should be imposed only for conviction of
specified crimes which impugn trustworthiness. Convictions of such crimes
should engender automatic disbarment regardless of whether the crime is
denominated a felony or a misdemeanor; it is the constituent elements of the
crime, not the label placed on it, that are indicative of untrustworthiness.
Crimes involving such elements as fraud, deceit, and misappropriation are
examples of crimes that indicate untrustworthiness." 17 Additionally, crimes
such as murder, rape, and arson demonstrate a serious deficiency in moral
character rendering an attorney unworthy of any kind of trust.
In addition to a system of selective application of automatic disbarment, the
attorney should be automatically suspended upon conviction of any crime not
enumerated under the automatic disbarment rule. The suspension would
continue until the attorney filed notice of his conviction with the appellate
division department in which he was admitted. The appellate division would
then hold hearings to determine whether any discipline should be imposed.' 8
This procedure should aid in the administration of discipline by encouraging
attorneys to report their convictions promptly.'" 9
CONCLUSION
Although adoption of the suggested automatic disbarment rule would retain
the efficiency of automatic procedures while disposing of the problems inher-
ent in the felony standard, much more is needed. The protection of the public
requires a profession imbued with pride and a sense of responsibility to
uphold the public trust. This can be achieved only through a complete
reevaluation of the role of the attorney in society. Moreover, a disciplinary
enforcement system should be designed that will demand the attorney's
compliance not only with the letter of the law but also with its spirit.'"
Beverly Deickler
subject the attorney to general disciplinary procedures. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(2) (McKinney 1968);
see notes 15-16, 23 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
117. Commission of these crimes requires knowledge on the part of the actor. Knowledge
should be a required element of all crimes included in automatic disbarment.
118. N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(2) (McKinney 1968); see notes 15-23 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 38-43, 56 supra and accompanying text. Such suspension would not constitute
discipline as, if it did, it would be recorded. See note 18 supra. The hearing following notice
would determine what, if any, discipline is necessary. The rules requiring court clerks to forward
notice of attorney convictions, see note 35 supra and accompanying text, should remain in effect
as a further check on attorneys who may consider not giving notice in the hope that their
convictions will not be discovered. It is suggested, however, that the general rule in Judiciary
Law § 486-a (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) be amended to require all court clerks to forward
notice of an attorney's conviction for any crime.
120. Bonomi, Attorney Registration: A Disciplinary Must, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1978, at 1. col.
1, at 30, col. 2. See generally Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 492 (1969) (Douglas, I.,
concurring); Address by Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust Division, The Future of Seyf-Regulation in the Legal Profession, ABA Nat'l Workshop
on Disciplinary Law and Procedure (June 2, 1978).
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APPENDIX-PROPOSED STATUTES 121
§ 90a. Disbarment for Conviction of Certain Crimes
1. Any attorney 22 who shall be convicted of any crime in subdivision 2 of
this section, in any state or federal court, 123 shall, upon such conviction, be
disbarred.
2. The provisions of this section shall apply to convictions of the following
crimes:
a) Murder (as per Penal Law §§ 125.25(1), (3), .27).
b) Rape (as per Penal Law §§ 130.35(1), .50(1), .65(1), .70(1)(a)).
c) Arson (as per Penal Law §§ 150.10, .15, .20).
d) Any other crime necessarily having one or more of the following
elements, which also requires the actor to act knowingly with respect
to such element:
i) false swearing
ii) misrepresentation
iii) fraud
iv) deceit
v) extortion
vi) misappropriation
vii) theft
e) Any crime of attempt or conspiracy to commit one of the aforemen-
tioned crimes. 124
3. Whenever any attorney shall be convicted of such crime, there may be
presented to the appellate division of the supreme court a certified or
exemplified copy of the judgment of such conviction, and, thereupon, the
name of the person so convicted shall, by order of the court, be stricken from
121. These proposals would repeal only N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4), (5) (McKinney 1968 & Supp.
1978-1979). The proposed laws are put in separate sections because they are distinct from each
other and from the general procedures now prescribed under § 90. The automatic disbarment bill
would include a repealer of § 90(4), (5).
122. The definition of "attorney" as including both attorneys and counsellors-at-law should be
specified in the preamble to the Judiciary Law, rather than repeating the cumbersome phrase
"attorney and counsellor-at-law" whenever referring to an attorney.
123. See notes 81-98 supra and accompanying text. Impermissible delegation would not be an
issue because New York law would be setting the standard. See notes 96-97 supra and
accompanying text.
124. The list of crimes in this subdivision is merely illustrative of the types of crimes which
impugn trustworthiness, either by showing a specific breach of trust or a general lack of moral
character. See note 117 supra and accompanying text. Reasonable people may differ as to
whether this list is underinclusive. Therefore, the legislature should consider whether additional
crimes should fall within this subdivision. The Second Circuit disbarment rule provides: [A]
"serious crime, shall include any felony, federal or state, and any lesser crime a necessary element
of which, as determined by statutory or common law definition of such crime in the Jurisdiction
where the conviction has occured, is (a) interference with the administration of justice; (b) false
swearing; (c) misrepresentation; (d) fraud; (e) willful failure to file income tax returns; (f) deceit;
(g) bribery; (h) extortion; (i) misappropriation; (j) theft; or (k) an attempt, or conspiracy, or
solicitation of another to commit a serious crime." 2d Cir. R. 46(g)(2). See also 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§
603.12(b) (Ist Dep't), 691.7(b) (2d Dep't), 1022.21(b) (4th Dep't) (1968-1969).
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the roll of attorneys. The attorney shall be given notice of this proceeding and
an opportunity to give any evidence that he is not the person convicted.-2
4. The appellate division shall have power to vacate or modify such order
or disbarment upon:
a) Reversal of the attorney's conviction, or
b) Pardon of the attorney by the president of the United States, or
governor of this or another state, or
c) If during a period of seven years after the name of the attorney has
been stricken from the roll of attorneys, he has not been convicted of
a crime.
126
5. This section shall apply to attorneys convicted on or after [its effective
date]. 127
6. Attorneys disbarred under § 90(4) of the Judiciary Law in effect until
[the effective date of this law], who would not have been so disbarred under
this section, may, within three years of [effective date], apply to the appellate
division for an order to vacate or modify such previous order to disbarment.
This subdivision shall be repealed on [three years from effective date].12 8
§ 90b. Suspension Upon Conviction of Any Crime
1. Any attorney who shall be convicted of any crime, not listed in § 90a, in
any state or federal court, shall, upon such conviction, be suspended from the
practice of law until he shall file written, signed, notice of such conviction
with the appellate division of the judicial department in which he was
admitted to practice.
2. Such notice shall include, at least, the name and current residence and
business address of the convicted attorney, the date of conviction, the name of
the court in which he was convicted, and the crime for which he was
convicted.
3. Suspension under this section shall not be deemed discipline.12 9
4. This section shall apply only to persons convicted on or after [its
effective date].
125. Because this section is removed from the general hearing provisions of § 90, it provides
for notice of the proceeding to strike the attorney's name in case there may be a question of
mistaken identity. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
126. This provision incorporates the new readmission law as modified by the suggestions in
notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
127. Although the retroactive application of disciplinary rules has been held to be permissible,
In re Leifer, 63 A.D.2d 174, 407 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1978) (per curiam); In re Hopfl, 62 A.D.2d 161, 404
N.Y.S.2d 601 (1978) (per curiam), for reasons of fairness, this statute will be applied prospec-
tively only.
128. The three year statute of limitations is designed to prevent both administrative burden
and stale litigation.
129. See notes 18, 118-19 supra and accompanying text.
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